cam a22 2 4500 317108611 CHVBK 20201009031809.0 cr nn|008mamaa 140522s2014 xx -----s---- 0 0-eng-d 978-3-642-24306-6 print 978-3-642-24307-3 eISBN 10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3 doi (OCoLC)882942961 (IDSSG)000655595 Springer ger SzZuIDS HSG kids HD87-87.55 POL024000 bisacsh 338.9 23 CH0010119CE66EBCA753DC1257F0700703593 iCapture Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law Volume I Basic Concepts and Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct by Richard S. Markovits Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent/ger Computermedien c rdamedia/ger Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier/ger This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers' price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each's determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm's economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm's economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of "oligopolistic conduct” that some economists have implicitly used-conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator's belief that its rivals' responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct-contrived and natural-by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these ... Economics Public law Economic policy Markovits Richard S. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3 Volltext für Angehörige der Universität St. Gallen / FHS St. Gallen BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 noalma ids I IDSSG HSG HSG ONL HONL000655595 IDSSG HFHS HFHS ONL HONL000655595 IDSSG 700 1- Markovits Richard S. IDSSG 856 4- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3 Volltext für Angehörige der Universität St. Gallen / FHS St. Gallen SWISSBIB 317108611