cam a22 2 4500 31710862X CHVBK 20201009031809.0 cr nn|008mamaa 140522s2014 xx -----s---- 0 0-eng-d 978-3-642-24312-7 print 978-3-642-24313-4 eISBN 10.1007/978-3-642-24313-4 doi (OCoLC)882942935 (IDSSG)000655596 Springer ger SzZuIDS HSG kids HD87-87.55 POL024000 bisacsh 338.9 23 CH001AAE904A6889FE126C1257F07007035B4 iCapture Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law Volume II Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Mergers, Vertical Practices, and Joint Ventures by Richard S. Markovits Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent/ger Computermedien c rdamedia/ger Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier/ger Volume 2 uses the economic and legal concepts/theories of Volume 1 to (1) analyze the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers, joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for vertical integration and (2) assess related positions of scholars and U.S. and E.U. antitrust officials. Its analysis of horizontal mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for determining whether they manifest specific anticompetitive intent, would lessen competition, or are rendered lawful by the efficiencies they would generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts' traditional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC Guidelines and the European Commission (EC) Guidelines, and the various non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have increasingly been using, (3) argues that, although the 2010 U.S. Guidelines and DOJ/FTC officials discuss market definition as if it matters, those Guidelines actually reject market-oriented approaches, and (4) reviews the relevant U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of conglomerate mergers (1) shows that they can perform the same legitimate and competition-increasing functions as horizontal mergers and can yield illegitimate profits and lessen competition by increasing contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation barriers to investment, (2) analyzes the determinants of all these effects, and (3) assesses limit-price theory, the toe-hold-merger doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of vertical conduct (1) examines the legitimate functions of each type of such conduct, (2) delineates the conditions under which each manifests specific anticompetitive intent and/or lessens competition, and (3) assesses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. Its analysis of joint ventures (1) explains that they violate U.S. law only when they manifest specific anticompetitive intent while they violate E.U... Economics Public law Economic policy Markovits Richard S. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24313-4 Volltext für Angehörige der Universität St. Gallen / FHS St. Gallen BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 noalma ids I IDSSG HSG HSG ONL HONL000655596 IDSSG HFHS HFHS ONL HONL000655596 IDSSG 700 1- Markovits Richard S. IDSSG 856 4- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24313-4 Volltext für Angehörige der Universität St. Gallen / FHS St. Gallen SWISSBIB 317108611