cam a22 2 4500 357889770 CHVBK 20200107115713.0 cr ||||||||||| 160307s2016 xxu||||||---- 00 |eng-d (OCoLC)944080856 (IDSSG)000855792 SzZuIDS HSG ger rda Coey Dominic Verfasser aut A Theory of Bidding Dynamics and Deadlines in Online Retail Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen, Brennan Platt Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research 2016 1 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent/ger Computermedien c rdamedia/ger Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier/ger NBER working paper series 22038 22038 (IDSSG)000043070 523018967 We present an equilibrium search model that parsimoniously rationalizes the use of auctions as a sales mechanism for new-in-box goods--a frequent occurrence in online retail markets--and analyze whether the existence of these auctions is welfare enhancing relative to a market consisting only of posted prices. Buyers have a deadline by which the good must be purchased, and sellers choose between auctions and posted-price mechanisms. As the deadline approaches, buyers increase their bids and are more likely to buy through posted-price listings. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion even for new, homogeneous goods. Using data on one million auction and posted-price listings for new-in-box items on eBay.com, we find robust evidence consistent with our model. As predicted, bidders increase their bids from one auction to the next, equilibrium price dispersion exists, and auctions and posted-price listings coexist. Fitting the model to the data, we find that retail auctions increase total welfare by 1.8% of the average retail price if listing fees exactly cover platform costs, but reduce welfare by 2.3% if listing fees are pure profit Larsen Bradley Verfasser aut Platt Brennan Verfasser aut http://www.nber.org/papers/w22038 Full text for the University of St. Gallen Metadata Rights Reserved ids I noalma ids I IDSSG 100 1- Coey Dominic Verfasser aut IDSSG 490 0- NBER working paper series 22038 22038 (IDSSG)000043070 523018967 IDSSG 700 1- Larsen Bradley Verfasser aut IDSSG 700 1- Platt Brennan Verfasser aut IDSSG 856 -- http://www.nber.org/papers/w22038 Full text for the University of St. Gallen Metadata rights reserved idssg BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 IDSSG HSG HSG ONL HONL000855792