caa a22 4500 378891766 CHVBK 20180305123456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20041201xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1554-8597.1069 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1554-8597.1069 Sequential Decision Analysis of the Traditional Deterrence Game [Elektronische Daten] [Lisa J. Carlson, Raymond Dacey] We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender. We treat two variations of the game - the complete information game and the one-sided information game where the first mover, Challenger, is the uncertain player. We employ sequential decision theory to analyze the game of incomplete information. The analysis is basic in that we employ a simplifying assumption, specifically that Challenger's valuation of the status quo is fixed at zero. We examine the behavior of Challenger using both a von-Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule and a Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. The formal results show that given the right combination of outcome valuations and probability values and weightings, Challenger can make choices under the von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule that are reversed from those made under the Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. We then relate these reversals to the concept of misperception found in the International Relations and Peace Science literatures. Finally, we comment on extensions of the ensuing analysis. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston deterrence game nationallicence decision theory nationallicence prospect theory nationallicence Carlson Lisa J. Department of Political Science, University of Idaho aut Dacey Raymond College of Business and Economics, University of Idaho aut Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy De Gruyter 10/3(2004-12-01) 10:3 2004 10 peps https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1069 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1069 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Carlson Lisa J. Department of Political Science, University of Idaho aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dacey Raymond College of Business and Economics, University of Idaho aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy De Gruyter 10/3(2004-12-01) 10:3 2004 10 peps CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter