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   <subfield code="a">Economic Consequences of Constitutions: A Theory and Survey</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">The paper outlines why and how political institutions, especially constitutional ones, matter for what decisions are made in the political process and thereby for how the economy functions. The main part contains a survey of empirical studies in this area. Among the things covered: the effects of political and economic freedom, not least property rights, on economic growth; how stricter budgetprocess rules affect tendencies for deficits; the role of electoral systems for shaping policies and affecting fiscal deficits; and the effects of separation of powers  e.g., federalism and referenda  on government size.Ce papier retrace dans les grandes lignes pourquoi et comment les institutions politiques, notamment celles de nature constitutionnelle, importent pour les décisions prises au niveau politique et en conséquence sur la manière dont fonctionne léconomie. La majeure partie du papier consiste en un examen des études empiriques dans ce domaine. Parmi les choses analysées : les effets de la liberté politique et économique, en particulier les droits de propriété, sur la croissance économique ; comment des règles plus strictes lors de lélaboration du budget influent sur la tendance au déficit ; le rôle des systèmes électoraux dans lélaboration des politiques et dans la taille des déficits ; et les effets de la séparation des pouvoirs  par exemple fédéralisme et referenda  sur la taille du gouvernement.</subfield>
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