caa a22 4500 378898736 CHVBK 20180305123512.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20040323xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0653.1188 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0653.1188 Membership Diversity in Club Decisions [Elektronische Daten] [Gary Biglaiser, James Friedman] We examine a club model in which the club's policies are controlled by a homogeneous group of insiders. Their policy decision is to determine the number they will admit from two outsider groups. Countries have immigration policies, private clubs have membership policies, and professional practices also have membership criteria in which individuals may be screened. In all these organizations new members bring a material benefit to the organization, but do so at the cost of introducing a socially differentiated population of outsiders that the majority typically dislikes. It is the interplay of the material benefit and the social cost on which we focus. We characterize steady state equilibria and examine comparative statics results. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston clubs nationallicence immigration nationallicence Biglaiser Gary University of North Carolina, gbiglais@email.unc.edu aut Friedman James University of North Carolina, jim@huckie.com aut Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-03-23) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1188 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1188 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Biglaiser Gary University of North Carolina, gbiglais@email.unc.edu aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Friedman James University of North Carolina, jim@huckie.com aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-03-23) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter