Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.2202/1538-0653.1136 |2 doi |
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| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Robert W. Crandall, Allan T Ingraham, Hal J Singer] |
| 520 | 3 | |a An expanding economics literature has examined the theoretical linkages between mandatory unbundling in the telecommunications sector and the incentives to invest in facilities by both incumbent local carriers and competitive carriers. Recent empirical evidence that substantiates the theory has emerged. That literature documents CLECs' reluctance to make facilities-based investments instead of availing themselves of incumbents' UNEs at low regulated prices that are based on total element long-run incremental costs (TELRIC). By examining the variation in facilities-based investment in loops across U.S. states and over time, we find that facilities-based line growth relative to UNE growth was faster in states where the cost of UNEs was higher relative to the cost of facilities-based investment. | |
| 540 | |a ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a telecommunications |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a regulation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a unbundling |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Crandall |D Robert W. |u E-mail: rcrandall@brookings.edu |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ingraham |D Allan T. |u E-mail: allan.ingraham@naviganteconomics.com |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Singer |D Hal J. |u E-mail: hal_singer@criterioneconoimcs.com |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy |d De Gruyter |g 4/1(2004-06-07) |q 4:1 |1 2004 |2 4 |o bejeap | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1136 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Crandall |D Robert W. |u E-mail: rcrandall@brookings.edu |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Ingraham |D Allan T. |u E-mail: allan.ingraham@naviganteconomics.com |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Singer |D Hal J. |u E-mail: hal_singer@criterioneconoimcs.com |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy |d De Gruyter |g 4/1(2004-06-07) |q 4:1 |1 2004 |2 4 |o bejeap | ||
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