caa a22 4500 378898787 CHVBK 20180305123512.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20041213xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0653.1333 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0653.1333 Cadigan John 1American University, jcadigan@american.edu Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives [Elektronische Daten] [John Cadigan] This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost' voters by running a 'get out the vote' campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group's influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest's influence, resulting in inefficiency. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston Collective Action nationallicence Interest Groups nationallicence Vote Drives nationallicence Elections nationallicence Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-12-13) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1333 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1333 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Cadigan John 1American University, jcadigan@american.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-12-13) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter