caa a22 4500 378898825 CHVBK 20180305123512.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20040310xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0653.1223 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0653.1223 Spatial Competition and Merger [Elektronische Daten] [Richard S Higgins, Paul A Johnson, John T Sullivan] We consider a computational equilibrium model of spatially differentiated Bertrand competition and apply it to merger analysis. Two pricing paradigms are studied: one where firms cannot price discriminate among customers and one where firms can. The model encompasses many details that make it highly realistic. A detailed example illustrates several insights into merger analysis that are not readily apparent through traditional means. The most important of these is that merger of substitute products under Bertrand price competition need not result in a price increase. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston merger nationallicence demand estimation nationallicence Higgins Richard S. LECG, LLC, rhiggins@lecg.com aut Johnson Paul A. LECG, LLC, paul.johnson@bateswhite.com aut Sullivan John T. LECG, LLC, jsullivan@lecg.com aut Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-03-10) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1223 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1223 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Higgins Richard S. LECG, LLC, rhiggins@lecg.com aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Johnson Paul A. LECG, LLC, paul.johnson@bateswhite.com aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sullivan John T. LECG, LLC, jsullivan@lecg.com aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-03-10) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter