caa a22 4500 37889885X CHVBK 20180305123513.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20040316xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0653.1167 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0653.1167 Commitment and Discretion in Health Care Policy Making [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Rosenman, Daniel Friesner] This paper analyzes the welfare effect from government sponsored insurance under two policy regimes for reimbursement levels - the first under which policy makers commit to a specific reimbursement schedule, the second which allows discretion in setting reimbursement schedules. We find that prices and quality will differ depending on which policy regimen is followed. We are able to identify a level for the policy maker's elasticity of utility with respect to its policy tool under which government insured patients are unambiguously better off with policy commitment. The ordering of welfare is reversed if the elasticity of utility is reversed. In either case, privately insured patients may be better or worse off. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston cost shifting nationallicence cost adjusting nationallicence government reimbursement nationallicence rules versus discretion nationallicence Rosenman Robert Washington State University, yamaka@wsu.edu aut Friesner Daniel Gonzaga University, dfriesner@weber.edu aut Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-03-16) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1167 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1167 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rosenman Robert Washington State University, yamaka@wsu.edu aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Friesner Daniel Gonzaga University, dfriesner@weber.edu aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-03-16) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter