Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion
Gespeichert in:
Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Néstor Gandelman, Rubén Hernández-Murillo]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2004
Enthalten in:
Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4/1(2004-05-28)
Format:
Artikel (online)
Online Zugang:
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.2202/1538-0653.1219 |2 doi |
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| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Néstor Gandelman, Rubén Hernández-Murillo] |
| 520 | 3 | |a We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location. In a game between local authorities, we find that, when communities differ in size, in equilibrium the smaller community sets lower taxes and attracts agents from the larger jurisdiction. With identical communities, tax rates must be equal. Finally, we examine the incentives of jurisdictions to harmonize tax rates and find that, whenever the smaller community benefits from tax harmonization, the larger jurisdiction will benefit also. | |
| 540 | |a ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a H20, H26, H30, H77 |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Tax Competition |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Tax Evasion |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Tax Harmonization |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Risk Aversion |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Gandelman |D Néstor |u Universidad ORT, gandelman@ort.edu.uy |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Hernández-Murillo |D Rubén |u Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ruben.hernandez@stls.frb.org |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy |d De Gruyter |g 4/1(2004-05-28) |q 4:1 |1 2004 |2 4 |o bejeap | |
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Gandelman |D Néstor |u Universidad ORT, gandelman@ort.edu.uy |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Hernández-Murillo |D Rubén |u Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ruben.hernandez@stls.frb.org |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy |d De Gruyter |g 4/1(2004-05-28) |q 4:1 |1 2004 |2 4 |o bejeap | ||
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