Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Néstor Gandelman, Rubén Hernández-Murillo]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2004
Enthalten in:
Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4/1(2004-05-28)
Format:
Artikel (online)
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024 7 0 |a 10.2202/1538-0653.1219  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0653.1219 
245 0 0 |a Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Néstor Gandelman, Rubén Hernández-Murillo] 
520 3 |a We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location. In a game between local authorities, we find that, when communities differ in size, in equilibrium the smaller community sets lower taxes and attracts agents from the larger jurisdiction. With identical communities, tax rates must be equal. Finally, we examine the incentives of jurisdictions to harmonize tax rates and find that, whenever the smaller community benefits from tax harmonization, the larger jurisdiction will benefit also. 
540 |a ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston 
690 7 |a H20, H26, H30, H77  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Tax Competition  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Tax Evasion  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Tax Harmonization  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Risk Aversion  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Gandelman  |D Néstor  |u Universidad ORT, gandelman@ort.edu.uy  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Hernández-Murillo  |D Rubén  |u Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ruben.hernandez@stls.frb.org  |4 aut 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Hernández-Murillo  |D Rubén  |u Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ruben.hernandez@stls.frb.org  |4 aut 
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