caa a22 4500 37889904X CHVBK 20180305123513.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20040528xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0653.1219 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0653.1219 Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion [Elektronische Daten] [Néstor Gandelman, Rubén Hernández-Murillo] We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location. In a game between local authorities, we find that, when communities differ in size, in equilibrium the smaller community sets lower taxes and attracts agents from the larger jurisdiction. With identical communities, tax rates must be equal. Finally, we examine the incentives of jurisdictions to harmonize tax rates and find that, whenever the smaller community benefits from tax harmonization, the larger jurisdiction will benefit also. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston H20, H26, H30, H77 nationallicence Tax Competition nationallicence Tax Evasion nationallicence Tax Harmonization nationallicence Risk Aversion nationallicence Gandelman Néstor Universidad ORT, gandelman@ort.edu.uy aut Hernández-Murillo Rubén Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ruben.hernandez@stls.frb.org aut Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-05-28) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1219 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1219 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Gandelman Néstor Universidad ORT, gandelman@ort.edu.uy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Hernández-Murillo Rubén Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ruben.hernandez@stls.frb.org aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 4/1(2004-05-28) 4:1 2004 4 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter