caa a22 4500 378920626 CHVBK 20180305123604.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e200405 xx s 000 0 mul 10.1515/SATS.2004.54 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.1515/SATS.2004.54 Fricke Christel Filosofisk Institutt, Avdeling for Filosofi, Universitetet i Oslo. christel.fricke@filosofi.uio.no Mündigkeit und Tugend [Elektronische Daten] [Christel Fricke] Moral principles are universally valid, valid for all human beings in so far as they are mature, responsible and of a sound mind - this idea is an essential part of our understanding of morality. Moral principles do not allow for any exceptions. Therefore, we expect from every person we take for mature and responsible to do her or his moral duty. This does not mean that we are naive about the moral goodness of human beings. We just cannot give up this expectation without considering a person as immature and irresponsible, as not being provided with a sound mind so that we cannot blame her or him for any moral failure. Any analysis of moral motivation therefore has to explain both that all responsible persons can and must have a disposition to moral agency and that for all of them this disposition is somehow privileged so that, in a case of confl icting dispositions of volition and action, it is the moral dispositions that finally determine the aim or purpose of the action. On this background, the theories of moral motivation provided by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith are compared. Whereas Hume seems to give up the whole idea of universal validity of moral principles and moral obligation, both Kant and Smith try to explain how dispositions to moral agency can be as omnipresent and motivationally strong as they should be - given the implication of our moral expectations. However, both theories meet with essential difficulties because they cannot exclude the influence of contingent factors on the moral motivation of a responsible person. © Philosophia Press 2004 SATS Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG 5/1(2004-05), 54-70 1600-1974 5:1<54 2004 5 SATS https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2004.54 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2004.54 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Fricke Christel Filosofisk Institutt, Avdeling for Filosofi, Universitetet i Oslo. christel.fricke@filosofi.uio.no NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- SATS Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG 5/1(2004-05), 54-70 1600-1974 5:1<54 2004 5 SATS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter