caa a22 4500 378936239 CHVBK 20180305123641.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20040117xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0645.1129 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0645.1129 Contestable Licensing [Elektronische Daten] [Zvika Neeman, Gerhard Oskar Orosel] We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing -- a franchisee holds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another firm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not verifiable, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston franchise bidding nationallicence natural monopoly nationallicence regulation nationallicence contestable markets nationallicence quality nationallicence Neeman Zvika Boston University and Hebrew University, zvika@post.tau.ac.il aut Orosel Gerhard Oskar University of Vienna, gerhard.orosel@univie.ac.at aut Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 3/1(2004-01-17) 3:1 2004 3 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1129 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1129 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Neeman Zvika Boston University and Hebrew University, zvika@post.tau.ac.il aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Orosel Gerhard Oskar University of Vienna, gerhard.orosel@univie.ac.at aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 3/1(2004-01-17) 3:1 2004 3 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter