Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Danny Ben-Shahar, Assaf Jacob]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2004
Enthalten in:
Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, 3/1(2004-09-28)
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 378936298
LEADER caa a22 4500
001 378936298
003 CHVBK
005 20180305123641.0
007 cr unu---uuuuu
008 161128e20040928xx s 000 0 eng
024 7 0 |a 10.2202/1538-0645.1189  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0645.1189 
245 0 0 |a Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Danny Ben-Shahar, Assaf Jacob] 
520 3 |a We present a perfect Nash equilibrium in which the creator of a work, motivated by economic considerations, selectively enforces her own copyright. In fact, the creator may not only permit, but may strategically promote infringement of the copyright, thereby participating indirectly in predatory pricing, and so raising barriers to entry. Our model is highly applicable to the software industry, where relatively high entry costs and the relatively low cost of copyright infringement make this phenomenon likely. We further show the conditions under which exogenous intervention, through intensive enforcement of copyrights, increases social welfare. Finally, we explore some potential strategies for such legal intervention. 
540 |a ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston 
690 7 |a K21, L12, L41, O34  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Antitrust  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Copyright  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Predatory Pricing  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Monopoly  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Microsoft  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Nash Equilibrium  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Price Discrimination  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Ben-Shahar  |D Danny  |u The Interdisciplinary Center, danny@idc.ac.il  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Jacob  |D Assaf  |u IDC, jacoba@post.tau.ac.il  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy  |d De Gruyter  |g 3/1(2004-09-28)  |q 3:1  |1 2004  |2 3  |o bejeap 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1189  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
908 |D 1  |a research article  |2 jats 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1189  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Ben-Shahar  |D Danny  |u The Interdisciplinary Center, danny@idc.ac.il  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Jacob  |D Assaf  |u IDC, jacoba@post.tau.ac.il  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy  |d De Gruyter  |g 3/1(2004-09-28)  |q 3:1  |1 2004  |2 3  |o bejeap 
900 7 |b CC0  |u http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0  |2 nationallicence 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-gruyter