caa a22 4500 37893631X CHVBK 20180305123641.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161128e20041203xx s 000 0 eng 10.2202/1538-0645.1306 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)gruyter-10.2202/1538-0645.1306 Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms [Elektronische Daten] [Oriana Bandiera, Gilat Levy] This paper analyses the consequences of an unusual type of land redistribution; we take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that such "moderate" reform reduces agency costs and thereby increases productivity, total surplus in the economy, and the welfare of rural workers. Compared to the classic redistribution "to the tiller", moderate reforms do worse in terms of equity and do not give the poor a collaterizable asset. They can however do equally well in terms of efficiency and might be more sustainable both financially and politically. ©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston land reform nationallicence moral hazard nationallicence Bandiera Oriana LSE, o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk aut Levy Gilat LSE, g.levyl@lse.ac.uk aut Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 3/1(2004-12-03) 3:1 2004 3 bejeap https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1306 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1306 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bandiera Oriana LSE, o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Levy Gilat LSE, g.levyl@lse.ac.uk aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy De Gruyter 3/1(2004-12-03) 3:1 2004 3 bejeap CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-gruyter