caa a22 4500 386308853 CHVBK 20180307111538.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198806 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2330880 doi S002210900001303X pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2330880 Stoughton Neal M. The Information Content of Corporate Merger and Acquisition Offers [Elektronische Daten] [Neal M. Stoughton] This paper explores the implications for the information content of acquisition offers in an economy with asymmetric information. It is shown that mergers can be socially beneficial due to risk reduction and information asymmetry even when there are no productive synergies and when positive premia are paid. The properties of equilibria with and without mergers are derived and contrasted in order to obtain a quantitative bound on potential merger premia. Theory is related to empirical evidence, where our results show that aggregate valuation gains can accrue on a purely informational basis. Moreover, the model developed here has important implications for the reported differences in tender offer and merger studies. Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1988 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Cambridge University Press 23/2(1988-06), 175-197 0022-1090 23:2<175 1988 23 JFQ https://doi.org/10.2307/2330880 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2330880 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Stoughton Neal M. NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Cambridge University Press 23/2(1988-06), 175-197 0022-1090 23:2<175 1988 23 JFQ CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge