caa a22 4500 386308969 CHVBK 20180307111538.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2331023 doi S0022109000012916 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2331023 Narayanan M. P. Debt versus Equity under Asymmetric Information [Elektronische Daten] [M. P. Narayanan] In a world of asymmetric information in which only the insiders know the quality of the firm, it is claimed that debt, even if it is risky, is more advantageous than outside equity because issuance of debt is less attractive to inferior firms. The advantage to debt arises from the fact that it can keep unprofitable firms out of the market, thus improving the average quality of firms in the market. This advantage exists even if the firms cannot be perfectly sorted in the signaling equilibrium. Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1988 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Cambridge University Press 23/1(1988-03), 39-51 0022-1090 23:1<39 1988 23 JFQ https://doi.org/10.2307/2331023 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2331023 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Narayanan M. P. NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Cambridge University Press 23/1(1988-03), 39-51 0022-1090 23:1<39 1988 23 JFQ CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge