caa a22 4500 386312303 CHVBK 20180307111552.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1988 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0020818300027703 doi S0020818300027703 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0020818300027703 Wagner R. Harrison Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence [Elektronische Daten] [R. Harrison Wagner] Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone. Whether this is true is independent of the degree of asymmetry in the economic relationship, or its direction. An explanation is given for the fact that other scholars have reached different conclusions, and the implications of these results for our understanding of a variety of types of relations among governments are derived. Copyright © The IO Foundation 1988 International Organization Cambridge University Press 42/3(1988), 461-483 0020-8183 42:3<461 1988 42 INO https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027703 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027703 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wagner R. Harrison Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Organization Cambridge University Press 42/3(1988), 461-483 0020-8183 42:3<461 1988 42 INO CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge