caa a22 4500 386319103 CHVBK 20180307111619.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1358246100004768 doi S1358246100004768 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1358246100004768 Faith and the Existence of God [Elektronische Daten] Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for granted; if the argument works, the premises provide grounds for affirming the conclusion. A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises necessitate, that is, entail, the conclusion. (It would involve a self-contradiction to assert the premises but deny the conclusion.) What I shall call a ‘correct' inductive argument is one in which the premises in some degree probabilify the conclusion, but do not necessitate it. More precisely, in what I shall call a correct P-inductive argument the premises make the conclusion probable (i.e. more probable than not); in what I shall call a correct C-inductive argument, the premises add to the probability of the conclusion (i.e. confirm it, make it more probable than it was; but do not necessarily make it overall probable). Arguments only show their conclusions to be true if they start from true premises; arguments of the above types which work (i.e. are valid or correct) and do start from such premises I will call sound arguments. Arguments are only of use to show to an individual that the conclusion is true if he already knows the premises to be true. Most of what I shall have to say today concerns arguments with respect to which there is no doubt that the premises are true. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1988 Swinburne R. G. Barrett D. C. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 24(1988-03), 121-143 1358-2461 24<121 1988 24 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004768 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004768 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Swinburne R. G. NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Barrett D. C. NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 24(1988-03), 121-143 1358-2461 24<121 1988 24 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence SWISSBIB 386319022 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge