caa a22 4500 386319251 CHVBK 20180307111619.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0957042X0000986X doi S0957042X0000986X pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0957042X0000986X Griffiths A. Phillips Is Free Will Incompatible with Something or Other? [Elektronische Daten] [A. Phillips Griffiths] Professor Vesey poses the following question: ...philosophers talk of ‘free will' with a view to justifying our engaging in the practice of treating people as responsible for what they do. But why do we feel the need for a justification? It is because they want, also, to engage in the practice of looking for (motor) causes of everything that happens, and feel that the two practices are somehow incompatible? If so, then it is very paradoxical that they should turn to Descartes, and his theory of willing. Descartes' answer to the question ‘What does a person do immediately?', namely ‘He performs an act of will', has what I call ‘the incompatibility feature', whereas Aristotle's answer has not. Why are they not content to say, with Aristotle, that the two practices are compatible, and hence there is no need for a justification? Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1988 Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series Cambridge University Press 24(1988-03), 101-119 0957-042X 24<101 1988 24 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X0000986X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X0000986X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Griffiths A. Phillips NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series Cambridge University Press 24(1988-03), 101-119 0957-042X 24<101 1988 24 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge