caa a22 4500 386330573 CHVBK 20180307111712.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198909 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0022050700008779 doi S0022050700008779 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0022050700008779 Losing to Win: U.S. Steel's Pricing, Investment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938 [Elektronische Daten] U.S. Steel held two-thirds of the American market in 1901, but by the 1930s its share had dropped to one-third. Such a decline is consistent with the economic theory of oligopoly pricing and capacity expansion, but the available data offer limited opportunities for formal testing of hypotheses. A close examination of U.S. Steel's early history leads us to argue that Chairman Elbert Gary's desire for price stability, his fear of antitrust litigation, and shortcomings in the firm's organizational capability constrained it from the unbridled pursuit of discounted profits that the economic theory assumes. Copyright © The Economic History Association 1989 McCraw Thomas K. Straus Professor of Business History, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02163. Reinhardt Forest Ph.D. candidate in Business Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/3(1989-09), 593-619 0022-0507 49:3<593 1989 49 JEH https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700008779 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700008779 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- McCraw Thomas K. Straus Professor of Business History, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02163 NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Reinhardt Forest Ph.D. candidate in Business Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/3(1989-09), 593-619 0022-0507 49:3<593 1989 49 JEH CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge