caa a22 4500 386330875 CHVBK 20180307111713.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198906 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0022050700007968 doi S0022050700007968 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0022050700007968 Lipartito Kenneth Assistant Professor of History, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204. System Building at the Margin: The Problem of Public Choice in the Telephone Industry [Elektronische Daten] [Kenneth Lipartito] This article considers whether natural monopoly conditions or AT'T's market power was responsible for the formation of a single, standardized network in the United States telephone industry. It shows that AT&T was able to move the industry towards a single system under its management through a strategy of competition and compromise with competitors. The article also examines the impact of AT's actions on state regulators, concluding that public officials, lacking necessary knowledge and authority to set policy, ended up supporting AT's position in the industry. Copyright © The Economic History Association 1989 The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/2(1989-06), 323-336 0022-0507 49:2<323 1989 49 JEH https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700007968 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700007968 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lipartito Kenneth Assistant Professor of History, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204 NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/2(1989-06), 323-336 0022-0507 49:2<323 1989 49 JEH CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge