caa a22 4500 38633093X CHVBK 20180307111713.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198906 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0022050700008032 doi S0022050700008032 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0022050700008032 Peters Lon L. Senior Economist, Public Power Council, 500 N.E. Multnomah, Suite 729, Portland, OR 97232. Managing Competition in German Coal, 1893-1913 [Elektronische Daten] [Lon L. Peters] The history of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate before World War I demonstrates that a cartel can be established and maintained in the face of significant disintegrative forces, including many members, heterogeneous production and cost conditions, dynamic markets, competition from outside producers, and cheating. Opportunities for individualistic behavior, including contractual loopholes and horizontal combinations, combined with a collusive objective function that emphasized overall control and stability, allowed the cartel to survive for over two decades without government interference or support. Copyright © The Economic History Association 1989 The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/2(1989-06), 419-433 0022-0507 49:2<419 1989 49 JEH https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700008032 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700008032 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Peters Lon L. Senior Economist, Public Power Council, 500 N.E. Multnomah, Suite 729, Portland, OR 97232 NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/2(1989-06), 419-433 0022-0507 49:2<419 1989 49 JEH CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge