caa a22 4500 386331731 CHVBK 20180307111717.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0022050700009475 doi S0022050700009475 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0022050700009475 Greif Avner Assistant Professor of Economics at Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders [Elektronische Daten] [Avner Greif] This article examines the economic institution utilized during the eleventh century to facilitate complex trade characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract enforceability. The geniza documents are employed to present the "coalition”, an economic institution based upon a reputation mechanism utilized by Mediterranean traders to confront the organizational problem associated with the exchange relations between merchants and their overseas agents. The the oretical framework explains many trade-related phenomena, especially why traders utilized specific forms of business association, and indicates the interrelations between social and economic institutions. Copyright © The Economic History Association 1989 The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/4(1989-12), 857-882 0022-0507 49:4<857 1989 49 JEH https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700009475 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700009475 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Greif Avner Assistant Professor of Economics at Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/4(1989-12), 857-882 0022-0507 49:4<857 1989 49 JEH CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge