caa a22 4500 386332207 CHVBK 20180307111719.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0022050700009463 doi S0022050700009463 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0022050700009463 Libecap Gary D. Professor of Economics and Director of the Karl Eller Center, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States, 1933-1972 [Elektronische Daten] [Gary D. Libecap] This article examines a government-sponsored cartel that fixed domestic crude oil prices in interstate markets from 1933 through 1972. Although the cartel raised and stabilized nominal oil prices beyond earlier private efforts, it also resulted in politically driven constraints on price, output levels, and cartel rent distribution. Political factors molded quota assignments, diverted production from low- to high-cost producers, and raised production costs. Political pressures prevented Texas from acting as a residual or swing producer. Instead, the interstate oil cartel members maintained nominal prices and spread the political costs of output adjustments. Copyright © The Economic History Association 1989 The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/4(1989-12), 833-855 0022-0507 49:4<833 1989 49 JEH https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700009463 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700009463 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Libecap Gary D. Professor of Economics and Director of the Karl Eller Center, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 49/4(1989-12), 833-855 0022-0507 49:4<833 1989 49 JEH CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge