caa a22 4500 386335486 CHVBK 20180307111732.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198907 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S084182090000285X doi S084182090000285X pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S084182090000285X Brink David O. Semantics and Legal Interpretation (Further Thoughts) [Elektronische Daten] [David O. Brink] In my article "Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review” I tried to do three main things. First, I tried to establish a link between familiar issues within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of the law and familiar issues within constitutional theory about the scope and record of judicial review via their common dependency on assumptions about the nature of legal interpretation. Second, I argued that a proper theory of interpretation has at least two important components: a theory of the semantics of legal terms and a theory about how best to characterize the purposes or intentions underlying legal provisions. Third, I sketched my own account of these two components of legal interpretation and then explored their implications for these familiar disputes within legal theory and constitutional theory. In particular, the semantic claims that I outlined require us (a) to distinguish between the meaning or reference of legal terms and people's beliefs about the extension of those terms and (b) to rely on theoretical considerations, of various kinds, in ascertaining the extension of general terms occurring in legal provisions. The account of underlying purpose that I sketched requires legal interpreters to identify the purpose of a legal provision with the abstract values that the framers of that provision sought to implement, rather than with the specific activities that they sought to regulate, and then to determine the extension of these values (i.e., the activities that these provisions, properly understood, do regulate) by appeal to theoretical considerations about the nature of these principles and policies. These interpretive claims, I argued, tend to vindicate a belief in the determinacy of the law in hard cases and the style, if not the content, of the Court's exercise of judicial review in cases concerning individual rights, against worries that in these cases it has exceeded the scope of legitimate judicial review. Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1989 The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Cambridge University Press 2/2(1989-07), 181-191 0841-8209 2:2<181 1989 2 CJL https://doi.org/10.1017/S084182090000285X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S084182090000285X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Brink David O. NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Cambridge University Press 2/2(1989-07), 181-191 0841-8209 2:2<181 1989 2 CJL CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge