caa a22 4500 386335508 CHVBK 20180307111732.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198907 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0841820900002848 doi S0841820900002848 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0841820900002848 Patterson Dennis M. Realist Semantics and Legal Theory [Elektronische Daten] [Dennis M. Patterson] In "Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review”, David O. Brink advocates a central role in legal interpretation for considerations of human purpose. He states: It is important to remember that the primary objects of legal interpretation - statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents - like most objects of interpretation, are human artifacts, the products of purposeful activity. In interpreting the products of purposeful activity, we must appeal to the purposes which prompted and guided the activity whose product we are trying to understand. Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1989 The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Cambridge University Press 2/2(1989-07), 175-179 0841-8209 2:2<175 1989 2 CJL https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900002848 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900002848 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Patterson Dennis M. NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Cambridge University Press 2/2(1989-07), 175-179 0841-8209 2:2<175 1989 2 CJL CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge