caa a22 4500 386340145 CHVBK 20180307111747.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1961667 doi S0003055400088134 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1961667 Gowa Joanne University of Pennsylvania Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade [Elektronische Daten] [Joanne Gowa] Recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. I argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system: security externalities. Explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states. Less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two-power system. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/4(1989-12), 1245-1256 0003-0554 83:4<1245 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1961667 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1961667 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Gowa Joanne University of Pennsylvania NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/4(1989-12), 1245-1256 0003-0554 83:4<1245 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge