caa a22 4500 386340331 CHVBK 20180307111747.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1961664 doi S0003055400088109 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1961664 Bargaining in Legislatures [Elektronische Daten] Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 Baron David P. Stanford University Ferejohn John A. Stanford University American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/4(1989-12), 1181-1206 0003-0554 83:4<1181 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1961664 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1961664 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Baron David P. Stanford University NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ferejohn John A. Stanford University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/4(1989-12), 1181-1206 0003-0554 83:4<1181 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge