caa a22 4500 386341141 CHVBK 20180307111751.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198909 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1962067 doi S0003055400086044 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1962067 Wittman Donald University of California Santa Cruz Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection [Elektronische Daten] [Donald Wittman] This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating and the use of verification technology. These propositions yield several paradoxes of information (for example, the better the verification technology, the less often it will be employed). Since the analysis incorporates both simultaneous and sequential moves by the players, it provides new insights into other applied areas as well as game theory. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/3(1989-09), 923-945 0003-0554 83:3<923 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1962067 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1962067 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wittman Donald University of California Santa Cruz NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/3(1989-09), 923-945 0003-0554 83:3<923 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge