caa a22 4500 386341206 CHVBK 20180307111751.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198909 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1962065 doi S0003055400086020 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1962065 Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action [Elektronische Daten] We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action—a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 Finkel Steven E. University of Virginia Muller Edward N. University of Arizona Opp Karl-Dieter University of Hamburg American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/3(1989-09), 885-903 0003-0554 83:3<885 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1962065 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1962065 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Finkel Steven E. University of Virginia NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Muller Edward N. University of Arizona NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Opp Karl-Dieter University of Hamburg NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/3(1989-09), 885-903 0003-0554 83:3<885 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge