caa a22 4500 386341850 CHVBK 20180307111755.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198906 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1962402 doi S0003055400083349 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1962402 Powell Robert Harvard University Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Powell] Recent formal work in nuclear deterrence theory has focused on brinkmanship crises in which states exert coercive pressure by manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear exchange. This essay extends the formal analysis of deterrence theory to the strategy of limited retaliation in which states exert coercive pressure by inflicting limited amounts of damage in order to make the threat of future punishment more credible. This strategy is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information. The equilibria suggest that states prefer relatively smaller, less-destructive limited options; that counterforce options are desirable even if they cannot limit the total amount of damage an adversary can inflict; that smaller, less-destructive limited nuclear options may make a nuclear exchange more likely; and that uncertainty and incomplete information may significantly enhance deterrence. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/2(1989-06), 503-519 0003-0554 83:2<503 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1962402 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1962402 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Powell Robert Harvard University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/2(1989-06), 503-519 0003-0554 83:2<503 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge