caa a22 4500 386342814 CHVBK 20180307111759.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1956434 doi S0003055400082253 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1956434 Powell Robert Harvard University Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Powell] In the logic of crisis stability, first-strike advantages may still be destabilizing, although even a successful first strike cannot protect a state from a terribly costly retaliatory second strike. If there is an advantage to striking first and if war seems sufficiently likely, launching a preemptive first strike may seem to be the least of evils. I reconsider the logic of crisis stability by studying games that are completely stable, although there are first-strike advantages. Four general conditions ensure stability. Identifying these conditions refines our understanding of crisis stability by also identifying the potential sources of instability, and this more refined understanding shows that the logic of crisis stability focuses attention too narrowly on first-strike advantages. Stability results from a more subtle interaction of several factors of which a first-strike advantage is only one. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/1(1989-03), 61-76 0003-0554 83:1<61 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1956434 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1956434 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Powell Robert Harvard University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/1(1989-03), 61-76 0003-0554 83:1<61 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge