caa a22 4500 386343225 CHVBK 20180307111801.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/1956433 doi S0003055400082241 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/1956433 Modeling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt [Elektronische Daten] We present a contingency model of Soviet foreign policy making that focuses on decision making in the Politburo. The model is designed around three questions and shows how the answers to these questions determine the likely nature of the decision the Politburo will reach at any point in time. The questions are (1) Whose positions on the Politburo are critical to making a decision? (2) What are the positions or preferences of those who count on the issue under consideration? (3) How are disagreements among these individuals handled? The model is illustrated by examining the Soviet decision to increase significantly the numbers and types of weapons delivered to Egypt in early 1973. Of interest in this case is accounting for the shift in Soviet policy from refusing Egypt offensive weapons to providing them. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989 Stewart Philip D. Ohio State University Hermann Margaret G. Ohio State University Hermann Charles F. Ohio State University American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/1(1989-03), 35-59 0003-0554 83:1<35 1989 83 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/1956433 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/1956433 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Stewart Philip D. Ohio State University NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Hermann Margaret G. Ohio State University NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Hermann Charles F. Ohio State University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 83/1(1989-03), 35-59 0003-0554 83:1<35 1989 83 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge