caa a22 4500 386364699 CHVBK 20180307111928.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1989 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0012217300015766 doi S0012217300015766 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0012217300015766 Curtis Robert A. Trinity University The Success of Hyperrational Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Response to Sobel [Elektronische Daten] [Robert A. Curtis] Several recent commentators have suggested that for fully rational agents who find themselves in iterated prisoner's dilemmas of indefinite length, co-operation is the rational strategy. Their argument is that these fully rational agents can be taught, through the co-operative actions of other agents, to bypass the dominant move of noncooperation and co-operate instead. The proponents of the "teaching strategy” seem to have ignored the compelling argument of Jordan Howard Sobel. While the teaching argument may work for agents who are less than purely rational, Sobel has pointed out that hyperrational utility maximizers cannot be taught; they reason deductively, not inductively, as the "teaching argument” requires. Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1989 Dialogue Cambridge University Press 28/2(1989), 265-274 0012-2173 28:2<265 1989 28 DIA https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300015766 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300015766 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Curtis Robert A. Trinity University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Dialogue Cambridge University Press 28/2(1989), 265-274 0012-2173 28:2<265 1989 28 DIA CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge