caa a22 4500 386364788 CHVBK 20180307111928.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1989 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0012217300015754 doi S0012217300015754 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0012217300015754 Allen Barry McMaster University Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke's Sceptic Replies [Elektronische Daten] [Barry Allen] Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has enlivened recent discussion of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Yet it is quite possible to disengage his interpretive thesis from its supporting argumentation. Doing so leaves one with an intriguing sceptical argument which Kripke first powerfully advances, then tries to halt. But contrary to the impression his argument may leave, Kripke's solution and the position it concedes to the Sceptic are deeply allied. Here I shall demonstrate their common assumption, and on that basis argue that Kripke's solution begs the Sceptic's question. Furthermore, I believe we can live with the Sceptic. The sceptical argument can be turned into a reasonable contribution to a kind of nominalism in the philosophy of meaning and truth. Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1989 Dialogue Cambridge University Press 28/2(1989), 257-264 0012-2173 28:2<257 1989 28 DIA https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300015754 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300015754 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Allen Barry McMaster University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Dialogue Cambridge University Press 28/2(1989), 257-264 0012-2173 28:2<257 1989 28 DIA CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge