caa a22 4500 386378517 CHVBK 20180307112031.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0008423900020254 doi S0008423900020254 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0008423900020254 Lewis Thomas J. McMaster University On Using the Concept of Hypothetical Consent [Elektronische Daten] [Thomas J. Lewis] This article argues that the concept of hypothetical consent advanced by Hanna Pitkin has little force as a basis for political obligation. It reformulates the meaning of hypothetical consent by emphasizing the subjectivity of consent, and it points out how this subjective meaning expresses the right of actual citizens to dissent. It suggests how subjective hypothetical consent can be used from the perspective of a sovereign as a standard that requires the sovereign to treat citizens as if they had consented, although they have not consented. It concludes by arguing that although this standard may appear to corrode political authority, instead it enhances political authority. It drives the sovereign to relinquish the claim that citizens are obligated to obey, and to treat them so they will have reason to obey. Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1989 Canadian Journal of Political Science Cambridge University Press 22/4(1989-12), 793-808 0008-4239 22:4<793 1989 22 CJP https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900020254 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900020254 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lewis Thomas J. McMaster University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Canadian Journal of Political Science Cambridge University Press 22/4(1989-12), 793-808 0008-4239 22:4<793 1989 22 CJP CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge