caa a22 4500 386379734 CHVBK 20180307112036.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198909 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0008423900010933 doi S0008423900010933 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0008423900010933 Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: Superpower Cases, 1948-1979 [Elektronische Daten] Using a modified version of Chicken, referred to as the Threat Game, Brams and Kilgour have developed a theoretical model of threat escalation and stability in superpower crises. More specifically, they derive explicit thresholds for sufficient pre-emption to stabilize a crisis before it escalates out of control. An appropriate degree of coercion thereby is designated for the response to an adversary, in order to deter further escalation. The overall objective of this study is to use data on superpower crises to test a modified version of the model developed by Brams and Kilgour. Mixed results emerge from testing the most general propositions. The choice of response level usually does not surpass the model's recommended value. However, stabilization is feasible in virtually all crises and, when an actor does meet the threshold, satisfaction with the outcome occurs more frequently than otherwise. Two more specific hypotheses also are tested, with partial support for the model once again being the result. Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1989 James Patrick McGill University Harvey Frank McGill University Canadian Journal of Political Science Cambridge University Press 22/3(1989-09), 523-545 0008-4239 22:3<523 1989 22 CJP https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900010933 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900010933 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- James Patrick McGill University NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Harvey Frank McGill University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Canadian Journal of Political Science Cambridge University Press 22/3(1989-09), 523-545 0008-4239 22:3<523 1989 22 CJP CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge