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   <subfield code="a">Affirmative Action in the Law of Tort: The Case of the Duty to Warn</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">One of the principal features in the development of private law in recent years has been the dramatic increase in the variety of circumstances in which courts are willing to hold that one party owes a duty of care in tort to another. The view that the categories of relationship which attract a duty of care at common law are immutably fixed by precedent and that any decision to extend them must be left to the legislature, expressed by one Law Lord as recently as 1970, now seems somewhat quaint and it is generally accepted that courts can, in appropriate cases, extend the scope of liability for negligence to embrace new types of relationships, conduct and harm. As the boundaries of liability have been rolled back, old immunities have been removed and duties of care (albeit sometimes restricted) have been established in areas previously considered to be beyond the scope of the law of tort. But there are still areas of confusion and difficulty, perhaps the most prominent of which in recent years have been the extent of liability for economic loss and for nervous shock. Another area of doubt, however, is the extent of liability for omissions. While it has not attracted as much attention as economic loss or nervous shock, the distinction between acts and omissions still exercises a powerful influence on judicial decision making on the question of tortious liability. This article considers the question of liability for one such omission, namely liability for a failure to warn someone of imminent danger. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by an &quot;omission.”</subfield>
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