caa a22 4500 386384347 CHVBK 20180307112054.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1989 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0265052500001060 doi S0265052500001060 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0265052500001060 Railton Peter Philosophy, University of Michigan Naturalism and Prescriptivity [Elektronische Daten] [Peter Railton] Statements about a person's good slip into and out of our ordinary discourse about the world with nary a ripple. Such statements are objects of belief and assertion, they obey the rules of logic, and they are often defended by evidence and argument. They even participate in common-sense explanations, as when we say of some person that he has been less subject to wild swings of enthusiasm and disappointment now that, with experience, he has gained a clearer idea of what is good for him. Statements about a person's good present themselves as being about something with respect to which our beliefs can be true or false, warranted or unwarranted. Let us speak of these features as the descriptive side of discourse about a person's good. Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1989 Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 7/1(1989), 151-174 0265-0525 7:1<151 1989 7 SOY https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001060 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001060 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Railton Peter Philosophy, University of Michigan NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 7/1(1989), 151-174 0265-0525 7:1<151 1989 7 SOY CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge