caa a22 4500 386384355 CHVBK 20180307112054.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1989 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0265052500001035 doi S0265052500001035 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0265052500001035 Mack Eric Philosophy, Tulane University Moral Individualism: Agent-Relativity and Deontic Restraints [Elektronische Daten] [Eric Mack] My goal in this essay is to say something helpful about the philosophical foundations of deontic restraints, i.e., moral restraints on actions that are, roughly speaking, grounded in the wrongful character of the actions themselves and not merely in the disvalue of their results. An account of deontic restraints will be formulated and offered against the backdrop of three related, but broader, contrasts or puzzles within moral theory. The plausibility of this account of deontic restraints (and of the conception of moral rights which are correlative to these restraints) rests in part on how well this account resolves the puzzles or illuminates the contrasts which make up this theoretical backdrop. Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1989 Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 7/1(1989), 81-111 0265-0525 7:1<81 1989 7 SOY https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001035 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001035 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Mack Eric Philosophy, Tulane University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 7/1(1989), 81-111 0265-0525 7:1<81 1989 7 SOY CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge