caa a22 4500 386387370 CHVBK 20180307112102.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e198903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0034412500019764 doi S0034412500019764 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0034412500019764 Coulter Chan L. Gettysburg College, Pennsylvania Moral Autonomy and Divine Commands [Elektronische Daten] [Chan L. Coulter] A Divine Command Theory of Ethics is sometimes rejected on the grounds that such a theory is incompatible with human moral autonomy. If we assume that human beings are morally autonomous, the argument goes, then no human being can be obligated to perform any action simply because God (or any other agent) has commanded it. The incompatibility between a Divine Command Ethic and moral autonomy is a corollary of an argument James Rachels uses to deny the very existence of God. He argues that any being which can be denoted by the term God must be a being worthy of worship. But, in order to be a being worthy of worship it must be such that other beings owe it unconditional obedience. Since human beings are morally autonomous and cannot owe unconditional obedience to any other being, nothing can meet the criterion for being God. Hence, there is no possible state of affairs which includes both a being worthy of worship and morally autonomous human agents. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989 Religious Studies Cambridge University Press 25/1(1989-03), 117-129 0034-4125 25:1<117 1989 25 RES https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500019764 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500019764 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Coulter Chan L. Gettysburg College, Pennsylvania NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Religious Studies Cambridge University Press 25/1(1989-03), 117-129 0034-4125 25:1<117 1989 25 RES CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge