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   <subfield code="a">The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Free exercise jurisprudence is unique in constitutional law. Because direct regulation of religious activity almost never occurs, the litigation surrounding free exercise addresses only incidental and inadvertent regulation of religious conduct. For this reason, the issue in a free exercise challenge typically is not whether a law is constitutional; the law under attack is usually constitutionally unassailable outside of its incidental effect on religious practice. Rather, the issue is whether certain individuals should be exempted from otherwise valid, neutral laws of general applicability solely because of their religious conviction. The jurisprudence of free exercise, in short, is the jurisprudence of the constitutionally compelled exemption. There are a number of tensions underlying the notion of constitutionally compelled exemption and underlying the constitutional treatment of religion and religious belief, that make free exercise jurisprudence a particularly difficult subject for coherent analysis. First, because special exemptions of any kind raise concerns of undue favoritism, they are normally suspect as violating fundamental constitutional principles of equal treatment. Thus, as the Court noted recently, the conclusion that the Constitution may require the creation of an exemption directly contradicts the constitutional norm.</subfield>
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