caa a22 4500 388046295 CHVBK 20180307125039.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199804 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0020589300061856 doi S0020589300061856 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0020589300061856 Evans Andrew European Union Decision-Making, Third States and Comitology [Elektronische Daten] [Andrew Evans] Historically and conceptually, EU law originates in the idea that member States have approved restrictions of national sovereignty in the interests of establishing a common market. In accordance with this idea, significant elaboration or extension of these restrictions must also be approved by the member States or at least by a majority of their representatives in the Council of the Union. The implication is not only that the development of the rules of the common market is dependent on the will of the member States. The further implication is that the rules of the common market and the rules of Union decision-making are separable, in the sense that the latter rules are not affected by the former rules. While such implications are ill-adapted to the pluralist tendencies of integration processes, particularly the participation of third States (that is, non-member States) in these processes, they are confirmed by the formal structure of the EC Treaty. Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1998 International and Comparative Law Quarterly Cambridge University Press 47/2(1998-04), 257-277 0020-5893 47:2<257 1998 47 ILQ https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300061856 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300061856 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Evans Andrew NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International and Comparative Law Quarterly Cambridge University Press 47/2(1998-04), 257-277 0020-5893 47:2<257 1998 47 ILQ CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence SWISSBIB 350866988 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge