caa a22 4500 388050888 CHVBK 20180307125053.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199812 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1352325200001129 doi S1352325200001129 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1352325200001129 Marmor Andrei Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University Legal Conventionalism [Elektronische Daten] [Andrei Marmor] There are two questions I would like to address in this article. The first and main question is whether there are rules of recognition, along the lines suggested by H.L.A. Hart. The second question concerns the age-old issue of the autonomy of law. One of the main purposes of this article is to show how these two issues are closely related. The concept of a social convention is the thread holding these two points tightly knit in one coil. Basically, I will argue that a novel account of social conventions can be employed to reestablish Hart's thesis about the rules of recognition, and that this same account shows why, and to what extent, law is partly an autonomous practice. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998 Legal Theory Cambridge University Press 4/4(1998-12), 509-531 1352-3252 4:4<509 1998 4 LEG https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001129 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001129 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Marmor Andrei Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Legal Theory Cambridge University Press 4/4(1998-12), 509-531 1352-3252 4:4<509 1998 4 LEG CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge