<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">388050926</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180307125053.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">161130e199812  xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1017/S1352325200001105</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">S1352325200001105</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">pii</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1352325200001105</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Perry</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Stephen R.</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">University of Pennsylvania</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Hart's Methodological Positivism</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Stephen R. Perry]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">To understand H.L.A. Hart's general theory of law, it is helpful to distinguish between substantive and methodological legal positivism. Substantive legal positivism is the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and the content of law. Methodological legal positivism is the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral description of a particular social phenomenon, namely law. Methodological positivism holds, we might say, not that there is no necessary connection between morality and law, but rather that there is no connection, necessary or otherwise, between morality and legal theory. The respective claims of substantive and methodological positivism are, at least on the surface, logically independent. Hobbes and Bentham employed normative methodologies to defend versions of substantive positivism, and in modern times Michael Moore has developed what can be regarded as a variant of methodological positivism to defend a theory of natural law.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Legal Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Cambridge University Press</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">4/4(1998-12), 427-467</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">1352-3252</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">4:4&lt;427</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">1998</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">4</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">LEG</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001105</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001105</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">100</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Perry</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Stephen R.</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">University of Pennsylvania</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Legal Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Cambridge University Press</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">4/4(1998-12), 427-467</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">1352-3252</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">4:4&lt;427</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">1998</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">4</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">LEG</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="b">CC0</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-cambridge</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
