caa a22 4500 388050934 CHVBK 20180307125053.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199812 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1352325200001117 doi S1352325200001117 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1352325200001117 Shapiro Scott J. Yeshiva University On Hart's Way Out [Elektronische Daten] [Scott J. Shapiro] It is hard to think of a more banal statement one could make about the law than to say that it necessarily claims legal authority to govern conduct. What, after all, is a legal institution if not an entity that purports to have the legal power to create rules, confer rights, and impose obligations? Whether legal institutions necessarily claim the moral authority to exercise their legal powers is another question entirely. Some legal theorists have thought that they do—others have not been so sure. But no one has ever denied (how could they?) that the law holds itself out as having the legal authority to tell us what we may or may not do. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998 Legal Theory Cambridge University Press 4/4(1998-12), 469-507 1352-3252 4:4<469 1998 4 LEG https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001117 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001117 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Shapiro Scott J. Yeshiva University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Legal Theory Cambridge University Press 4/4(1998-12), 469-507 1352-3252 4:4<469 1998 4 LEG CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge