caa a22 4500 38805106X CHVBK 20180307125053.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199809 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1352325200001026 doi S1352325200001026 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1352325200001026 Raz Joseph Oxford University Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison [Elektronische Daten] [Joseph Raz] In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. But in some ways the more radical and surprising claim he makes is that not only were previous legal philosophers mistaken about the nature of law, they were also mistaken about the nature of the philosophy of law or jurisprudence. Perhaps it is possible to summarize his main contentions on the nature of jurisprudence in three theses: First, jurisprudence is interpretive: "General theories of law aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice” (LE, 90). Second, legal philosophy cannot be a semantic account of the word "law.” Legal philosophers "cannot produce useful semantic theories of law” (id.). Third, legal philosophy or jurisprudence "is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law” (id.). Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998 Legal Theory Cambridge University Press 4/3(1998-09), 249-282 1352-3252 4:3<249 1998 4 LEG https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001026 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001026 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Raz Joseph Oxford University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Legal Theory Cambridge University Press 4/3(1998-09), 249-282 1352-3252 4:3<249 1998 4 LEG CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge