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   <subfield code="a">Allies or Subversives? The Judiciary and Democracy</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">In the search for democracy, are judges allies or subversives? Until very recently, British constitutional law appeared to present a relatively straightforward answer to this perennial dilemma: judges are only allies if their power is clearly subordinate to that of Parliament. In terms of constitutional theory, this faith in the political process and corresponding distrust of the judiciary is expressed through the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. However, the imminent enactment of a Human Rights Act in Britain compels a reconsideration of this response. It is true that the judiciary has always played a significant role in law-making through the common law and statutory interpretation. It is true, too, that non-constitutional judicial review has developed vigorously in the past few decades. Yet it has always been possible to assert, not least by the judiciary, that law-making of this sort is subordinate to parliamentary law-making and is justifiable by and legitimated in terms of parliamentary intent. Parliamentary sovereignty has, of course, been challenged explicitly by membership of the European Union. Faced with the confident assertion by European Community institutions of the sovereignty of European Community law, the judiciary has gradually shifted its allegiance from Parliament and acknowledged the supremacy of EC law in its sphere of operation. This shift of allegiance is revolutionary in one way. Nevertheless, judicial law-making remains subordinate, although to a differently constituted legislature.</subfield>
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